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Aya Avishai: SETTING REALISTIC HEALTH GOALS: ANTECEDENTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES  
(Under the direction of Paschal Sheeran) 
 
People often fail to translate their intentions into health behaviors. The present research 
examined a new potential moderator of intention-behavior relations, namely, how realistic or 
unrealistic are respective goal intentions. Goal realism was defined as the degree to which intentions 
are aligned with expectations (i.e., predicted performance). A validation study (N = 81) examined 
our novel goal realism measure. Study 1 (N = 246) tested goal importance, fantasy proneness, and 
pathways thinking as predictors of realistic goal setting using a cross-sectional questionnaire design. 
Moderation of the intention-behavior relation was tested in prospective surveys of cervical cancer 
screening (Study 2, N = 854), physical activity (Study 3, N = 237), and performance of a suite of 15 
health behaviors (Study 4, N = 378). The validation study offered preliminary evidence concerning 
the convergent and predictive validity of the goal realism measure. Study 1 showed that goal 
importance, fantasy proneness, and pathways thinking interacted to predict how realistic were 
intentions to perform 11 health behaviors. In Study 2, realistic intentions better predicted women’s 
attendance for cervical cancer screening compared to unrealistic intentions. Study 3 confirmed this 
finding for a frequently performed behavior (physical activity). In Study 4, multi-level modeling of 
longitudinal data for 15 health behaviors again revealed a significant goal realism × intention 
interaction. Greater realism was associated with improved prediction of behavior by intention. The 
interaction term remained significant even when past behavior, perceived behavioral control, and 
other predictors were taken into account. The present findings offer new insights into the factors that 
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lead to more realistic intentions, and demonstrate that goal realism influences how effectively 
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 Goals are mental representations of desired outcomes whereas intention formation is the 
process of setting, and committing oneself to achieving, those goals (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 
1996). Although intentions are construed as the most immediate and important predictor of 
behavior in leading health behavior theories (Fishbein, Triandis, Kanfer, Becker, Middlestadt, & 
Eichler, 2001), research indicates that there is a substantial ‘gap’ between intentions and health 
behaviors (e.g., McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011; Rhodes & Bruijn, 2013; Sheeran, 
2002). As a result, considerable effort has been devoted to identifying factors that make it more 
or less likely that intentions will be translated into behavior. For instance, research indicates that 
properties of intention such as temporal stability are associated with improved prediction of 
behavior by intention (see Rhodes & Dickau, 2012, and Sheeran & Webb, 2016, for reviews). 
The present research contributes to this work by testing a new moderator of intention-health 
behavior relations – goal realism. In five studies we explore the validity of our goal realism 
index (Preliminary Validation Study), predictors of realistic goal setting (Study 1), and test 
whether setting realistic goals leads to improved translation of intentions into health behaviors 
(Studies 2-4).  
Goal Realism: Operationalization and Implications for Intention Realization 
 Imagine the following scenarios: A friend who is obese tells you that he intends to lose 
20 pounds in time for his wedding next month; another friend who engages in no leisure-time  
1This thesis previously appeared as an article in Annals of Behavioral Medicine. The original citation is as follows: 
Avishai, A., Conner, M., & Sheeran, P. (2019). Setting realistic health goals: Antecedents and consequences. Annals 
of Behavioral Medicine. Advance online publication. doi:10.1093/abm/kaz012 
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physical activity informs you that she plans to take part in a marathon in 8 weeks time. In both of 
these scenarios, individuals form healthful intentions; however, the intentions appear 
‘unrealistic.’ That is, it does not seem feasible that these intentions will be translated into action. 
Although the realism or lack of realism of people’s health goals has attracted attention in clinical 
contexts (e.g., Cunningham, 2014, and Gelinas, Delparte, Hart, Wright, 2013), goal realism has 
received relatively little theoretical attention in health behavior research (Sheeran & Webb, 
2012). The most influential treatment is Doran’s (1981) recommendation that goal setting should 
be SMART (i.e., Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, and Time-related).  
The difficulty of operationalizing goal realism is likely one reason why this construct has 
attracted so little research attention. It seems virtually impossible for an observer to determine in 
advance what is a ‘realistic’ health goal for any particular person. In the present research, we 
attempted to overcome this difficulty by exploiting the distinction between intentions (“I intend 
to do X!” or “I plan to do X!”) and expectations (“I predict that I will do X” or “How likely is it 
that you will do X?”). The intention vs. expectation distinction rests on the idea that a person may 
hold a strong intention and sincerely mean to perform a behavior, but also recognize the goal is very 
difficult to attain and so hold low expectations for its attainment. Measures of expectations take 
greater account of competing alternative behaviors and obstacles to goal achievement than intention 
measures (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988) and, consequently, expectations better predict 
behavior compared to intention (e.g., Armitage, Norman, Alganem, & Conner, 2015; see Sheppard 
et al., 1988, for a meta-analysis). Thus, goal realism is operationalized here as the extent to which 
intentions and expectations about health behaviors are aligned. Realistic goals mean that people’s 
intentions and expectations are consistent whereas intentions and expectations do not marry up for 
unrealistic goals.  
 
 3 
 Construing goal realism in terms of the consistency between intentions and expectations has 
the advantages that (a) how realistic is the respective intention is computed within-persons (in terms 
of the alignment of participants’ own intentions and expectations) and does not require an 
omniscient observer, and (b) goal realism can be assessed prior to performance of the behavior 
(using measures of intentions and expectations obtained beforehand). But how should the 
consistency or alignment of intentions and expectations be characterized quantitatively? One 
strategy might be to use difference scores (intention minus expectation). Assume for a moment that 
an intention scale ranges from 1 (definitely do not intend to act) to 7 (definitely intend to act) and the 
expectation scale also ranges from 1 (definitely do not expect to act) to 7 (definitely expect to act). 
Now, imagine that one participant rates their intention to perform a health behavior as “2” and their 
expectation as “1” on these scales. Another participant indicates that their intention is “7” and their 
expectation is “6.” Using a difference score approach, both participants receive a goal realism score 
of “1.” However, the meaning of these two “1” scores is very different as the first participant hardly 
intends to act whereas the second participant holds a very strong intention. Difference scores are 
problematic because these indices fail to discriminate potentially significant differences among the 
input scores used in their computation (see Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999, for discussion of the 
problems with using difference scores to assess complex psychological phenomena).  
 We followed Griffin’s lead in overcoming this problem by adopting his formula for 
ambivalence (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995), and adapting it to the issue of intentions versus 
expectations as follows: Goal	realism = 	 ,-./-.01-2	3	456/7.8.01-29 − |Intentions − Expectations| 
The Griffin ambivalence formula, which has been shown to have superior properties compared to 
other ambivalence indices (Breckler, 1994), has two key advantages. First, the formula takes into 
account not only the similarity of input ratings, but also the extremity of those ratings. Second, the 
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formula privileges more extreme or high scores, allowing us to focus on individuals who strongly 
intend to perform a particular health behavior. (People who strongly intend but fail to act are mainly 
responsible for the intention-behavior gap [Sheeran, 2002].) Using this formula, a participant with a 
score of “7” on intentions and “6” on expectations would receive a goal realism score of 5.5 
whereas a participant who scored “2” on intentions and “1” on expectations would receive 0.5 for 
goal realism. 
 Is it safe to assume that greater goal realism is associated with improved translation of 
intentions into action? On the one hand, research on counteractive optimism suggests that 
holding optimistic goals actually increases task persistence and performance (Zhang & Fishbach, 
2010). On the other hand, two other lines of research suggest that goal realism should strengthen 
intention-behavior relations. First, research on the planning fallacy (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 
1994) offers a clear-cut example of negative impact of unrealistic goals on task performance as 
the fallacy demonstrates that people dramatically underestimate task completion times – likely 
because they fail to take account of relevant past experiences. Second, fantasy realization theory 
shows that fantasizing about an action has negative consequences for motivation and 
performance (review, Oettingen, 2012). Fantasizing does not involve thinking about the effort it 
will take to achieve a goal, so when people fantasize their intentions can become unrealistic 
(inflated) and less likely to be translated into behavior.  
The Present Research 
 In one study, we test the validity of our measure of goal realism. In four further studies we 
examine (a) the antecedents of goal realism (Study 1), and (b) the consequences of goal realism for 































































PRELIMINARY VALIDATION OF THE MEASURE OF GOAL REALISM 
 We conducted a validation study in response to feedback to our initial submission, and 
after Studies 1-4 had been conducted. The study had two aims, namely, to demonstrate that our 
goal realism measure (a) is associated with an independent, self-report index of how realistic are 
set goals and (b) offers superior moderation of the predictive validity of intention compared to 
the self-report measure. Our second hypothesis derives from research on properties of attitudes 
and intentions (Bassili, 1996) indicating that operative measures (i.e., indirect measures that are 
inferred from participants’ responses) are more valid than direct self-reports (i.e., meta-
judgments). Thus, we predicted that our operative measure of goal realism – but not the self-
report measure – would moderate the relationship between intentions and anticipated 
disappointment (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). In particular, we predicted that goal realism 
would weaken the intention-disappointment relation (i.e., failing to enact intentions would lead 
to less disappointment when participants are realistic about the prospects of intention 
realization).  
Method 
 The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill IRB approved this study. Participants (N 
= 81, 48.1% women, M-age = 37.94, SD = 13.10) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) and were rewarded $0.50 for a survey concerning their views of 11 health behaviors. 
Many studies have demonstrated that MTurk offers more diverse and representative samples 
compared to college students, and results in high quality data (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; 
Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). The behaviors were selected on the basis of their importance for good 
 
 6 
health, and comprised ‘engaging in at least 150 minutes of moderate physical activity or 75 
minutes of vigorous physical activity each week,’ ‘avoiding snacking between meals,’ ‘eating a 
low-fat diet,’ ‘eating 2-4 servings of fruits each day,’ ‘eating 3-5 servings of vegetables each 
day,’ ‘avoiding drinking sugar-sweetened beverages,’ ‘flossing at least once a day,’ ‘ avoiding 
taking illegal drugs,’ ‘avoiding speeding while driving,’ ‘using sunscreen on sunny days,’ and 
‘avoiding smoking tobacco.’  
 Participants first indicated how disappointed they would be if they did not realize their 
intentions to perform the behaviors (7-point scale, 1 = not at all disappointed, 7 = very 
disappointed, α = .88 across the behaviors). Next, participants indicated their intentions to 
perform each of the 11 health behaviors (7-point scale, 1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes, α = 
.80) and then rated how realistic were those intentions on a 9-point scale (“How realistic are the 
intentions you have just reported? That is, how feasible is it that you will do exactly what you 
said you will do in your intention?”; 1 = very unrealistic, 9 = very realistic, α = .82). Participants 
then indicated their expectations for each of the health behaviors (7-point scale, 1 = not at all 
likely, 7 = extremely likely, α = .81). 
 To compute our operative measure of goal realism, we applied the Griffin formula to the 
measure of intentions and the measure of expectations, and computed the average realism across 
behaviors (α = .78). 
Results and Discussion 
 Findings showed that our operative measure of goal realism was significantly and 
strongly correlated with self-reported realism (r = .77, p < .001).  
 In a moderated regression analysis of anticipated disappointment on the measures of 
intention and operative goal realism, the intention × goal realism interaction proved significant (β 
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= -.29, p < .01). Simple slopes analyses indicated that more realistic intentions (M + 1SD) led to 
less disappointment (B = .74, SE = .36, p = .04) compared to less realistic intentions (B = 1.40, 
SE = .34, p < .001). Self-reported realism, on the other hand, did not moderate the intention-
disappointment relation (β = -.18, p = .12).  
 These findings offer preliminary evidence that computing goal realism using the Griffin 
formula is valid. Our index of goal realism was correlated with self-reported realism and better 
moderated the relationship between intention and anticipated disappointment compared to self-































































STUDY 1: ANTECEDENTS OF REALISTIC GOAL SETTING 
 In Study 1, we tested three predictors of goal realism: goal importance, fantasy proneness, 
and pathways thinking. Goal importance refers to the value a person assigns a goal based on his/her 
experience, and is positively associated with goal commitment and goal striving (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Sideridis & Kaissidis-Rodafinos, 2001). Fantasy proneness is a measure of how 
often a person daydreams about desirable outcomes (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001). 
Fantasy realization theory suggests that fantasizing causes people to focus on the desirability of 
acting rather than its feasibility, and could thus lead to unrealistic intentions. Finally, pathways 
thinking is the extent to which a person solves problems and thinks through ways to reach goals 
(Snyder, 2002). Greater pathways thinking should be associated with improved goal realism 
because intentions are likely to be informed by consideration of how feasible is the goal. We 
hypothesized that goal importance and pathways thinking would positively predict goal realism 
whereas fantasizing would negatively predict goal realism.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill IRB 
approved this study. We recruited participants online through MTurk and awarded them $0.50 
for participation. Twenty-five participants (9.2%) were excluded based on an attention check, 
leaving 246 participants for analysis. The majority of the sample was white or Caucasian (75.1%), 
non-Hispanic (93.1%), female (55.3%), and held at least a 2-year college degree (59.8%). 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 73 years (M = 36.14, SD = 11.37). The study measures 
included intention, expectation, and goal importance items regarding 11 health behaviors. 
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Additionally, we included a modified version of the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; 
Merckelbach et al., 2001), the Adult Hope Scale (AHS; Snyder et al., 1991), and demographic 
items. All participants answered the intention items first, followed by goal importance, pathways 
thinking, and fantasy-proneness in counterbalanced order, then the expectations items, and 
finally demographics. Data come from a larger project; only items relevant to the present study 
are described here.  
Measures. The behaviors were the same 11 as those used in the validation study. 
Intentions were measured by asking participants how much they intended to do the behaviors (1 
= definitely no, 7 = definitely yes), expectations were assessed by asking participants the 
likelihood that they would perform the behaviors (1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely likely), and 
goal importance was measured by asking people how important were these behaviors (1 = not at 
all important, 7 = extremely important). Scales were computed by averaging the items across 
behaviors and proved reliable (αs = .77, .80, and .84, respectively). Goal realism (α = .78) was 
computed using the Griffin formula described previously and used in the Validation Study (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.25). 
 Pathways thinking (Snyder, 2002) was measured by 4 items from the AHS (Snyder et al., 
1991; e.g., “I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are important to me”) and was 
reliable here (α = .83). Fantasy proneness was measured by the 8 items with the highest item-
total correlations in the CEQ (Merckelbach et al., 2001) and proved reliable (α = .78).  
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptives and correlations for Study 1 variables are reported in Table 1. Goal realism 
was significantly correlated with goal importance (r = .60, p < .001) and pathways thinking (r = 
.34, p < .001) but not fantasy proneness (r = .02, p = .72). Hierarchical regression of goal realism 
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on pathways thinking, goal importance, and fantasy proneness showed that goal importance (β = 
.56, p < .001) and pathways thinking (β = .22 p < .001) both positively predicted realism but 
fantasy proneness did not (β = -.07, p = .16). These variables explained 39.7% of the variance in 
goal realism, F(3, 242) = 54.66, p < .001.  
In the second step of the regression, we added all possible two- and three-way 
interactions to the equation and observed only a significant three-way goal importance × fantasy 
proneness × pathways thinking interaction (β = -.12, p = .04). Plotting the values for goal realism 
(see Figure 1) indicated that goal realism was greatest when fantasy proneness was low (M – 
1SD) and goal importance and pathways thinking were both high (M + 1SD). Thus, there were 































































STUDY 2: GOAL REALISM AND ATTENDING FOR CERVICAL CANCER 
SCREENING 
 
  Study 2 examined whether goal realism influences the relation between intention to 
attend, and attendance for, cervical cancer screening.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Participants were recruited in West Yorkshire, England 
through a regional screening hub that agreed to send out the study materials along with routine 
screening letters inviting them to make an appointment for a cervical screening. The National 
Health Service (NHS) Research Ethics Committee approved this study. Participants were 
informed that completion of the questionnaire had no bearing on their treatment and provided 
with contact information in the case that they had questions. A total of 10,000 consecutive 
eligible invitees were selected between February and May of 2013 and were randomized to one 
of the following four conditions using a computerized random number generator: 1) control 
condition, 2) demographic questionnaire condition, 3) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
questionnaire condition, 4) TPB questionnaire plus post-it note condition (Conner, Wilding, 
Sandberg, Wood, Jackson, Godin, Sheeran, unpublished). A total of 344 women were not 
eligible (e.g., no longer a resident in area, not at known address, deceased, or attended prior to 
invite), leaving 9,656 women in the sample. Women in the two TPB conditions who completed 
questionnaires about cervical screening were included in the analyses. The final sample 
comprised 854 women (M-age = 42.4 years, SD = 10.7) and controlling for condition did not 
affect the results reported here.  
Measures. The TPB questionnaire included seven items scored on 7-point Likert scales 
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that assessed expectations (“I will attend for a cervical smear in the next few weeks,” strongly 
disagree – strongly agree), intentions (“My intention to attend for a cervical in the next few 
weeks is…" not at all strong – strong), attitudes (“For me, attending a cervical smear in the next 
few weeks is…” not worthwhile – worthwhile, harmful – beneficial; r = .80), subjective norm 
(“People important to me would” disapprove – approve “of me attending for a cervical smear in 
the next few weeks”), and perceived behavioral control (“I feel I have” no control – complete 
control “over attending for a cervical smear in the next few weeks,”; “I am confident I can attend 
for a cervical smear in the next few weeks,” strongly disagree – agree; r = .58). Goal realism 
was computed in the same manner as the Validation Study and Study 1.  
The behavioral outcome was cervical screening attendance over the subsequent 26 weeks 
(yes/no). Past behavior assessed any previous cervical screening. Both were assessed objectively 
via medical records.  
 Analyses. We first examined descriptive data and intercorrelations among the variables. 
Behavior was then regressed on intentions, goal realism, and the intentions × goal realism 
interaction (using mean-centered scores) (step 1), attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control (step 2), and past behavior (step 3). Logistic regression was used, as the outcome 
was dichotomous. Simple slopes analyses were used to explore the relationship between intentions 
and behavior at different levels of goal realism (M – 1SD, M + 1SD). 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 2 reports descriptive data and intercorrelations among Study 2 variables. Table 3 
shows that intentions were a significant predictor of behavior at step 1 of the logistic regression. At 
step 2, intentions and the intentions × goal realism interaction significantly predicted screening (B = 
.82, p < .001 and B = .10, respectively, ps < .05). The addition of TPB variables and past behavior 
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significantly increased the proportion of variance in behavior explained but the intentions × goal 
realism interaction remained significant (B = .11, p < .01). Simple slopes analyses indicated that 
intentions were a significant predictor of behavior at low (M – 1SD) levels of goal realism, B = .65, 
p < .01, but were a significantly stronger predictor of behavior at high (M + 1SD) levels of realism, 
B = .99, p < .001 (Figure 2). 
 These findings indicate that intentions that exhibit greater goal realism better predict 
behavior compared to intentions with lesser goal realism. The intention × goal realism interaction 
remained significant even controlling for TPB variables and past behavior. Study 2 thus offers 































































STUDY 3: GOAL REALISM AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 
 Study 2 examined an infrequently performed behavior (cervical cancer screening) and used 
single-item measures of intentions and expectations to compute goal realism. To ensure that these 
factors did not unduly influence the findings for goal realism, Study 3 used multi-item measures of 
intentions and expectations and examined a frequently performed behavior (physical activity).  
Method 
 Participants and Procedure. The University of Leeds IRB approved the research 
protocol. Participants were a convenience sample of UK university students who completed 
anonymous paper and pencil or on-line questionnaires at three time-points. Each time-point was 
separated by two weeks and participants were incentivized to complete and return the 
questionnaire by a prize draw (two prizes of £50.00). A total of 284 students completed measures 
at baseline and we were able to match 237 of those students with their responses across all of the 
time points (M-age = 21.3 years, SD = 3.91, range = 17 to 45 years; 139 women, 98 men). All 
analyses are based on this sample of 237 respondents who were representative of the initial 
sample in terms of age, gender, and time 1 intentions (ps > .25).  
 Measures. The questionnaires contained measures of gender, age, intentions, and 
expectations at time 2 and a measure of exercise behavior at time 3 (all on 7-point scales unless 
otherwise stated). Additional items at were also measured each time point but are not reported here 
(see Conner et al., 2016, study 1, for additional information). Intentions were assessed by 2 items 
(“I intend to exercise vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next two weeks,” definitely do 
not – definitely do; “I plan to exercise vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next 2 weeks,” 
 
 15 
definitely no – definitely yes) and were averaged for an intention score (r = .97, p < .001). 
Expectations were assessed by 2 items (“How likely is it that you will exercise vigorously at 
least 3 times per week for the next 2 weeks?” not at all likely – extremely likely; “I expect to 
exercise vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next 2 weeks,” unlikely – likely). Items were 
averaged to form an expectation scale (r = .97, p < .001). Goal realism was measured in the same 
manner as the Validation Study and Studies 1 and 2. Attitudes (e.g., “For me, exercising 
vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next 2 weeks would be,” useless – useful, unpleasant 
– pleasant; 8 items, a = .67), subjective norm (e.g., “People who are important to me would” 
approve – disapprove “of me exercising vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next 2 
weeks”; 4 items, a = .84), and perceived behavioral control (e.g., “I am confident that I can 
exercise vigorously at least 3 times per week for the next 2 weeks,” extremely unconfident – 
extremely confident; 6 items, a = .83) were also assessed. 
 Past behavior and behavior were each assessed by the same two items that were 
standardized and then averaged (“I have exercised vigorously at least 3 times per week for the 
last 2 weeks,” definitely no – definitely yes; “Over the last four weeks I have exercised 
vigorously ____ times per week on average”; r = .77 for past behavior and .51 for behavior). 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptives and intercorrelations are reported in Table 4, and Table 5 reports the linear 
regression analyses. Replicating the findings from Study 2, we observed that the intention × goal 
realism interaction significantly predicted exercise behavior (β = .17, p < .001) even after 
controlling for TPB variables (β = .15, p < .01) and TBP variables and past behavior (β = .10, p < 
.05). Simple slopes (see Figure 3) indicated that when goal realism was low (M – 1SD), intentions 
did not predict behavior (B = .06, p = .12). However, intentions were strong predictors of behavior 
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at high levels of goal realism (M + 1SD; B = .25, p < .001). Thus, goal realism moderated intention-
behavior consistency for both an infrequently performed behavior (cervical cancer screening, Study 































































STUDY 4: GOAL REALISM AND PERFORMANCE OF MULTIPLE HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS 
 
Study 4 assessed the generalizability of the findings observed in Studies 2 and 3. In 
particular, we tested whether goal realism would moderate the intention-behavior relation for a 
suite of 15 health behaviors (Conner, McEachan, Taylor, O’Hara, & Lawton, 2015).  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. The University of Leeds IRB approved the study protocol. 
Participants were recruited using a variety of means (e.g., local newspaper advertisement, local 
government newsletter, internet advertisement) and received £20 (approximately $30) worth of 
gift vouchers for completing questionnaires at three time-points, each separated by one month. 
Data from the first two time points of the study are reported here. See Conner et al. (2015, study 
2) for further details. After eliminating missing data the final sample consisted of 378 adults (279 
women) with a mean age of 38.7 years (SD = 13.0). The sample was similar to the UK 
population in terms of age and education (20% at degree level or above for England), but less 
likely to be married and more likely to be female. Across the 15 behaviors there were a total of 
4604 person-behavior responses available for analysis. 
Measures. Participants completed items measuring the same constructs for each of 15 
health-related behaviors. The selected behaviors were based on UK government targets for 
health (Department of Health, 1999, 2004) and behaviors prevalent in the psychological and 
public health literature: eat 5 fruit and vegetables per day, wear a helmet when riding a bicycle, 
take recommended levels of physical activity, exercise regularly, eat a low fat diet, use sunscreen 
of at least 15SPF when exposed to the sun, take vitamin supplements, brush teeth twice a day, 
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floss teeth daily, binge drinking, drink more than the recommended daily limits of alcohol, 
smoking, using illegal drugs, exceeding the posted speed limit when driving, drinking and 
driving. The behaviors specified recommended levels whenever guidelines existed (e.g., eating 
five fruit and vegetables per day, using sunscreen of at least 15 SPF).  
Items were consistent across behaviors and measured on 7-point scales. Intention was 
measured by one item that remained consistent across behaviors (e.g., “I intend to exercise 
regularly over the next four weeks,” strongly disagree – strongly agree). Expectation was 
measured by one item that remained consistent across behaviors (e.g., “I am likely to exercise 
regularly over the next four weeks,” very unlikely – very likely). Goal realism was computed in 
the same manner as the Validation Study and Studies 1-3. Attitude was measured using four 
items (e.g., “Exercising regularly over the next four weeks would be,” harmful – beneficial, 
worthless – valuable, unpleasant – pleasant, not enjoyable – enjoyable, mean α = .86). 
Subjective norm was measured by two items (e.g., “Most people that are important to me think 
that” I should – I should not “exercise regularly over the next four weeks”; “I think that most 
people who are important to me will exercise regularly over the next four weeks,” definitely no – 
definitely yes; mean r = .40). Perceived behavioral control (PBC) was measured by two items 
(e.g., “If it were entirely up to me, I am confident that I could exercise regularly over the next 
four weeks,” strongly disagree – strongly agree; “I have control over whether or not I exercise 
regularly over the next four weeks,” strongly disagree – strongly agree; mean r = .41). All the 
above questions were recoded such that higher values represented more positive views of 
positive health behaviors (and more negative views of negative health behaviors). 
Behavior and past behavior were measured by the same items at time 1 and 2 (“On how 
many days in the past four weeks have you performed [behavior]?”). For sunscreen use, which is 
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context dependent, the question posed was: “In the past four weeks I have used sunscreen of at 
least 15SPF when exposed to the sun,” never – always, and was scored on a 1-7 scale. In order to 
use comparable measures of behavior, all scores were converted to percentage of time behaviors 
performed, i.e., 0% is 0 days or never, 100% is 28 days or always.  
Analyses. Data were analyzed in SPSS (version 20, SPSS Inc) and HLM (version 7, SSI). 
As behavior was clustered within individuals, the data were analyzed using Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling using HLM7 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) and random effects were used in order to 
allow variation across individuals. The data contained a two-level hierarchical structure, Level 1 
being the within-person variation and Level 2 being the between-person variability. The Level 1 
predictor variables were centered on the group mean. We report unstandardized coefficients, 
standard errors and standardized coefficients (calculated using the procedure outlined in Hox, 
2002).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 6 shows the results of the hierarchical linear modeling. Intentions (β = 0.621, p < 
.001) and the intentions × goal realism interaction (β = 1.373, p < .001) positively and significantly 
predicted health behavior. The interaction term remained significant controlling for the other TPB 
variables (β = 1.277, p < .001) and TPB variables and past behavior (β = 1.034, p < .001). Simple 
slopes analyses (Figure 4) using simple slopes analyses using the free software provided by 
Preacher (Model 1) at http://www.quantpsy.org/interact/hlm2.htm indicated that intentions 
significantly predict behavior at low levels of goal realism (B = 4.847, p < .001) but were stronger 
predictors of behavior at high levels of goal realism (B = 18.517, p < .001). 
Alternative explanations of Studies 2-4. We ran four additional analyses to rule out 
potential alternative explanations of the findings. First, we tested whether a difference score 
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measure of goal realism offered superior moderation of the intention-behavior relation compared to 
the measure derived from the Griffin formula. The difference score measure did not moderate 
intention-behavior consistency in Studies 2-4. Second, we examined whether goal realism is simply 
an alternative indicator of behavioral expectation, and tested the intention × expectation interaction 
term as a predictor of behavior. This interaction never proved significant. Third, we undertook the 
equivalent analyses for intention and tested the intention × intention quadratic term. This interaction 
proved significant in only one out of three tests, and the intention × goal realism interaction 
remained significant in this analysis. Thus, even though intention and expectation scores contribute 
to the measure of goal realism used here, goal realism – but not its components – consistently 
moderated intention-behavior relations. Finally, even though we controlled for PBC in several 
analyses, it is possible that goal realism is merely a marker for PBC, and PBC (rather than goal 
realism) moderates intention-behavior relations. Evidence did not support this hypothesis, however, 
as the intention × PBC interaction term proved significant in none of the three studies. Thus, the 
moderating effects of goal realism observed here cannot be attributed to sub-optimal measurement 
































































 We obtained preliminary evidence concerning the convergent validity of our goal realism 
index using a self-report metric. Four additional studies explored the antecedents and consequences 
of goal realism. In Study 1, goal importance, fantasy proneness, and pathways thinking were 
analyzed as predictors of goal realism in relation to 11 health behaviors. We found that goals are 
most realistic when the goal is important and a person engages in pathways thinking but not in 
fantasizing. In three subsequent behavioral studies, we examined the influence of goal realism on 
intention-health behavior relations. Our analyses revealed significant intention × goal realism 
interactions such that realistic intentions better predicted behavior than unrealistic intentions in all 
three studies. This interaction remained significant even when controlling for TPB variables 
(attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control) and past behavior. These findings are 
important in the light of previous research indicating that the gap between intentions and behavior is 
substantial (e.g., Sheeran & Webb, 2016). The present research indicates that setting realistic goals 
may help close the intention-behavior gap and improve the translation of intentions into action. 
Confidence in this conclusion is enhanced by the fact that moderation was observed (a) in three 
longitudinal studies with 4- to 26-week follow-ups, (b) among patients, members of the public, and 
students, (c) using objective and self-report measures of behavior, and (d) across more than 15 
different health behaviors. 
 These are the first studies to operationalize goal realism via an adaptation of Griffin’s 
ambivalence formula (Thompson et al., 1995) that indexes the consistency between people’s 
intentions and expectations for health actions. This approach enables the computation of goal 
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realism within persons, obviates the need for an observer (who ‘knows’ the feasibility of health 
actions), and avoids the problems with using difference scores. Simple slopes analyses (Figures 2-4) 
indicated that participants who intended to act (i.e., scored above the midpoint on the intention 
scale) particularly benefited from greater goal realism. In other words, the interactions showed that 
health behavior performance was greatest for those who held high but realistic intentions. 
 Although the findings obtained here appear robust as they involve multiple samples and 
behaviors, the studies have limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the present research did 
not experimentally manipulate goal realism. As these studies are the first to assess goal realism in 
terms of the alignment of intentions and expectations, correlational tests were a necessary initial 
step. However, we acknowledge that experimental tests should follow (e.g., using mindset 
manipulations, Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Another limitation is that an objective measure of 
behavior was utilized only in Study 2. However, Studies 3 and 4 replicated the results of Study 2 
using self-report measures of behavior (which was the only feasible way to measure the 15 
behaviors in Study 4). Additionally, the longest follow-up in the present research was 26 weeks. 
Further tests over more extended periods are needed to assess the durability of the influence of goal 
realism on intention-health behavior relations. Finally, the present studies leave several questions 
unanswered. For instance, although the Validation Study indicated that goal realism was related to 
anticipated disappointment, it would be valuable to test whether this association holds in relation to 
experienced disappointment or other affective outcomes in the wake of health behavior (non-
)performance. Similarly, it would be valuable to explore how goal realism relates to behavioral 
willingness (Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, & Russell, 1998), self-regulatory processes (de Bruin et al., 
2012), and other antecedents of behavior. Additionally, as the validation of our goal realism index 
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remains preliminary, replication of our findings with alternate goal realism measures is warranted, 
as are manipulations of goal realism. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the studies presented here have important implications 
for interventions as they suggest that setting more realistic intentions should lead to greater health 
behavior change. But how can goal setting become more realistic? Study 1 indicates that it may be 
possible to improve goal realism by increasing goal importance and pathways thinking and by 
decreasing fantasizing. Future research could focus on increasing goal realism through interventions 
targeting these predictors. Specifically, new studies could test interventions to help people view 
their goals as important. Davis and Haws (2017) recently demonstrated that it is possible to increase 
the importance of health goals using both choice sets and persuasion. For instance, considering 
health in a choice set involving less pressing goals served to increase the importance that 
participants assigned to health goals. Similarly, a persuasive communication that emphasized the 
benefits of good health increased goal importance scores. 
In the present research, fantasizing predicted lower goal realism which is consistent with 
fantasy realization theory’s proposal that fantasizing about desired outcomes has negative 
consequences for behavior change (review by Oettingen, 2012). Similarly, thinking about the 
obstacles in one’s present (negative) reality does not, on its own, change behavior. However, when 
people (a) mentally envisage the desired outcomes of behavior, and then (b) contemplate the 
obstacles in one’s present reality that stand in the way of the behavior, this sequence is termed 
mental contrasting and leads to increased motivation and action (Johannessen, Oettingen, & Mayer, 
2012; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2009; Sheeran, Harris, Vaughan, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2013). 
Mental contrasting also increases people’s inclination to plan (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001) 
and can be combined with implementation intentions to promote behavior change. Implementation 
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intentions are if-then plans that people can form to help them seize opportunities for, or overcome 
obstacles to goal striving – or in other words, to find pathways to achieving their goals (Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006). Mental contrasting with implementation intentions has proven effective in 
promoting health behaviors such as diet, physical activity, and weight loss (e.g., Christiansen, 
Oettingen, Dahme, & Klinger, 2010; Marquardt, Oettingen, Gollwitzer, Sheeran, & Liepert, 2017; 
Stadler, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2010). Thus, mental contrasting with implementation intentions 
could be an especially effective intervention for promoting goal realism as this self-regulation tool 
both (a) offsets the negative effects of fantasizing, and (b) promotes effective pathways thinking.  
In conclusion, the present research offers a new conceptual and empirical analysis that could 
enable researchers to designate particular intentions as more versus less realistic. Goal realism was 
defined as the alignment of the person’s intentions to act and their expectations of action, and 
evidence was found for the validity of this novel measure. Findings showed that goal importance, 
fantasy proneness, and pathways thinking combined synergistically to predict goal realism. In three 
empirical studies, we also observed moderation of the intention-behavior relation by goal realism; 
realistic intentions were better translated into action compared to unrealistic intentions. The present 
studies suggest that goal realism offers new insights into the intention-behavior gap and offers 




Table 1. Descriptives and Intercorrelations for Variables in Study 1 (N = 246) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
1. Pathways thinking - .229*** .140* .323*** .338*** 
2. Goal importance  - .115 .586*** .597*** 
3. Fantasy proneness   - .050 .023 
4. Intention    - .889*** 
5. Goal realism     - 
Mean 5.92 5.38 3.14 4.78 4.06 
(SD) (1.20) (0.99) (2.43) (1.06) (1.25) 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 2. Descriptives and Intercorrelations for Variables in Study 2 (N = 854) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
1. Behavior - .291*** .213*** .116*** .217*** .123*** .233*** 
2. Intention    - .714*** .437*** .691*** .120** .635*** 
3. Attitude   - .647*** .573*** .114*** .474*** 
4. Subjective norm    - .505*** .072* .304*** 
5. PBC     - .144*** .448*** 
6. Past behavior      - .124*** 
7. Goal realism       - 
Mean 0.74 6.59 6.74 6.82 6.65 0.91 6.27 
(SD) (0.44) (1.03) (0.72) (0.57) (0.76) (0.28) (1.68) 
Note. PBC = perceived behavioral control. 





Table 3. Logistic Regression of Behavior on Intention, Goal Realism, TPB Variables and Past Behavior in Study 2 (N = 854) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Nagelkerke R2 B SE  OR 95% CI    
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1 
Intention    .106***   .592   .083  1.807*** 1.537—2.126 
   
Step 2 
Intention    .120***   .824   .175  2.280*** 1.618—3.214 
Goal realism        .073   .057  1.075  0.963—1.201 
Intention × goal realism      .098   .040  1.103*  1.018—1.194 
 
Step 3 
Intention    .123***   .799   .204  2.224*** 1.491—3.318 
Goal realism        .071   .057  1.073  0.961—1.199   
Intention × goal realism      .107   .042  1.113*  1.025—1.207  
Attitude        .133   .179  1.143  0.805—1.622 
Subjective norm      -.247   .199  0.781  0.528—1.154 
Perceived behavioral control      .103   .147  1.109  0.831—1.478 
 
Step 4 
Intention    .132***   .816   .206  2.262*** 1.510—3.390 
Goal realism        .062   .057  1.064  0.951—1.190 
Intention × goal realism      .108   .042  1.115** 1.027—1.210 
Attitude        .123   .180  1.131   0.794—1.610 
Subjective norm      -.245   .202  0.783  0.527—1.162 
Perceived behavioral control      .076   .147  1.079  0.808—1.440 
Past behavior         .664   .268  1.943*  1.148—3.288 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. OR = Odds Ratio 




Table 4. Descriptives and Intercorrelations for Variables in Study 3 (N = 237) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
1. Behavior - .724*** .532* .259*** .582*** .796*** .779*** 
2. Intention    - .715* .331*** .569*** .734*** .875*** 
3. Attitude   - .388*** .428*** .544** .673** 
4. Subjective norm    - .329*** .276*** .289*** 
5. PBC     - .623*** .674*** 
6. Past behavior      - .789*** 
7. Goal realism       - 
Mean -0.10 4.51 5.30 5.74 5.18 0.00 3.77 
(SD) (0.90) (2.14) (1.28) (1.09) (1.31) (0.94) (2.44) 
Note. PBC = perceived behavioral control. 





Table 5. Linear Regressions of Behavior onto Intention, Goal Realism, Intention x Realism, TPB Variables and Past Behavior in Study 3 
(N = 237) 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     R2 ΔR2  B  SE       β    
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1 
Intention    .524 .524***  .304   .019   .724***   
   
Step 2 
Intention    .634 .110***  .151   .040   .360*** 
Goal realism        .167   .035   .454***    
Intention × goal realism      .040   .011   .167***   
 
Step 3 
Intention    .637 .003   .150   .042   .356*** 
Goal realism        .155   .037   .422***   
Intention × goal realism      .036   .011   .152**   
Attitude       -.012   .042  -.018 
Subjective norm       .008   .036   .010 
Perceived behavioral control      .047   .039   .068 
 
Step 4 
Intention    .703 .066***  .090   .039   .213* 
Goal realism        .089   .035   .242*   
Intention × goal realism      .024   .010   .100*   
Attitude       -.009   .038  -.013 
Subjective norm       .003   .033   .004 
Perceived behavioral control      .005   .036   .007 
Past behavior         .419   .059   .440***   
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




Table 6. Hierarchical Multi-Level Regressions Predicting Behavior for Study 4 (N of 
participants = 378; N of observations = 4604) 
 
Predictors B     SE β 
    
Step 1    
Intercept (γ00) 42.720 .285  
Intentions (γ10) 8.070 .392 0.440*** 
    
Step 2    
Intercept (γ00) 42.732 .289  
Intentions (γ10) 11.381 .633 0.621*** 
Goal realism (γ20)  -0.515 .367 -0.036 
Intentions × goal realism (γ30) 2.317 .177 1.373*** 
    
Step 3    
Intercept (γ00) 42.678 .289  
Intentions (γ10) 10.989 .543 0.599*** 
Goal realism (γ20) 0.910 .316 0.064 
Intentions × goal realism (γ30) 2.155 .148 1.277*** 
Attitudes (γ40)  -3.270 .666 -0.104*** 
Subjective norm (γ50)  9.862 .594 0.362*** 
Perceived behavioral control (γ60) -9.179 .341 -0.429*** 
    
Step 4    
Intercept (γ00) 42.696 .293  
Intentions (γ10) 6.169 .573 0.337*** 
Goal realism (γ20)  -0.364 .288 -0.026 
Intentions × goal realism (γ30) 1.746 .139 1.034*** 
Attitudes (γ40)  -4.210 .641 -0.133*** 
Subjective norm (γ50)  8.375 .581 0.307*** 
Perceived behavioral control (γ60) -9.963 .320 -0.465*** 
Past behavior (γ70) 7.076 .469 0.383*** 
    
Note. B = unstandardized coefficient. Intercept only model at Step 0, Deviance = 47094.9; 
Step 1, Deviance = 46138.1, X2(2) = 956.8, p < .001; Step 2, Deviance = 45730.7, X 2(7) = 
407.4, p < .001; Step 3, Deviance = 44031.3, X 2(18) = 1699.4, p < .001; Step 4, Deviance = 
43573.5, X 2(8) = 457.8, p < .001. 




Figure 1. Three-Way Interaction between Fantasy Proneness, Pathways Thinking, and 


























Figure 2. Interaction between Intention and Goal Realism Predicting Cervical Cancer 



















Figure 3. Interaction between Intention and Goal Realism Predicting Physical Activity 

















Figure 4. Interaction between Intention and Goal Realism in Predicting 15 Health 
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